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Competition and Cooperation in International Commercial Arbitration: 
The Birth of a Transnational Legal Profession 
 
 
Florian Grisel 
 
“For in the meantime the tightrope walker had begun his performance: he had come out of a 
small door and was walking along the rope, which was stretched between two towers so that 
it hung over the people and the marketplace. When he was just halfway across, the small door 
opened once again, and out jumped a colorful, buffoonish fellow who quickly followed after 
him. ‘Move it, lamefoot,’ he cried in a terrible voice, ‘get going, lazybones, chiseler, whey-
face! So I don’t tickle your heel with my foot! What do you think you’re doing here between 
these towers? Back in the tower is where you belong, behind bars, you who bar the way of 
one who is your better!’” 
 
Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra1 
 
  
Abstract 
  
This paper revisits the sociology of international commercial arbitration on the basis of 
unexploited archives and data. This material casts new light on the competition between 
“grand old men” and “young technocrats” in the 1980s and 1990s, a theme that has structured 
the analysis of international commercial arbitration since the pioneering work of Yves 
Dezalay and Bryant G. Garth (Dealing in Virtue). In contrast, the data show that the crucial 
transformative period actually took place between the 1950s and 1970s, when a relatively 
well-defined group of individuals emerged as the leading arbitrators at the International 
Chamber of Commerce. These individuals – the “secant marginals” – succeeded in 
constructing a cooperative interface (rather than competition) between otherwise separate 
legal systems and professions. In doing so, they created the conditions necessary for the 
emergence of a new transnational legal profession. At a more general level, the article 
proposes an alternative narrative of globalization, wherein actors operating at the intersection 
of various systems, create new arenas of governance on the basis of inter-system cooperation. 
  
 
Introduction 
  
International commercial arbitration [“ICA”] has become the preferred method for the 
settlement of important transnational business disputes over the course of the last half 
century,2 displacing domestic courts (Stone Sweet & Grisel 2017). A network of arbitral 
                                                
1 Transl. by Thomas Wayne, Part 1, Title 6. 
2 On the disputing parties’ preference for international commercial arbitration, see for instance the survey carried 
by White & Case and Queen Mary (University of London), ‘2015 International Arbitration Survey: 
Improvements and Innovations in International Arbitration.’ 
 2 
institutions, the International Chamber of Commerce [“ICC”] being the most important, 
processes the bulk of these disputes, the stakes of which are enormous. A recent survey of the 
leading law firms in the field reported information on 109 active ICA cases in which at least 
$500 million was ‘in controversy’, including fifty-eight cases in which claims totaled more 
than $1 billion, and nine with claims over $9 billion.3 The actors who manage the system, 
typically leading arbitrators themselves, once worked in relative obscurity. Today, they 
publish scholarship,4 organize conferences,5 and build new organizational forms for 
promoting arbitration,6 activities that are now accessible to the public. As the importance of 
ICA has grown so has interest in the sociological profile of arbitrators, and in how they 
succeeded in constructing ICA as a private system of transnational governance.  
The pioneering monograph by Yves Dezalay and Bryant G. Garth (1996), Dealing in 
Virtue,7 has dominated this topic for more than 20 years. Dezalay and Garth tracked the 
evolution of ICA between the 1980s and the 1990s, focusing on the competition between two 
groups of “merchants of law” which, they claimed, structured the emergence of a new “field” 
(Dezalay & Garth 1996:57). The first group of incumbents was composed of “grand old 
men,” a category dominated by “very senior European professors imbued with the traditional 
values of the European legal elites” (Dezalay & Garth 1996:34). The second group of 
challengers was made of “young technocrats” who acquired their legitimacy as litigators in 
Anglo-American law firms (Dezalay & Garth 1996:36). According to the authors, each of 
these groups drew their legitimacy from specific systems: the law schools of the civil law 
world on the one hand, and the law firms of the common law world on the other hand 
                                                
3 Michael Goldhaber, ‘Arbitration Scorecard 2013: Contract Disputes’ (The American Lawyer, 1 July 2013).  
4 Specialized reviews count, among others, Arbitration International, the Journal of International Arbitration, and 
the Revue de l’arbitrage. 
5 The annual congress organized by the International Council for Commercial Arbitration (ICCA) is particularly 
important in the field. 
6 These include, for instance, the International Council for Commercial Arbitration (ICCA) and the Milan Club 
of Arbitrators. 
7 This book followed an article published in the Law & Society Review (Dezalay & Garth 1995).  
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(Dezalay & Garth 1996:33-62). The divides between these two groups – cultural (civil 
law/common law), generational (old/young) and professional (professors/attorneys) – were 
progressively resolved in favor of the young technocrats. They prevailed over the grand old 
men in the 1980s, pushing arbitration from (i) an informal mode of dispute settlement to (ii) a 
judicialized system more akin to US “litigation” (Dezalay & Garth 1996:54). Put summarily, 
the “victory” of the young technocrats led to the emergence, and steady Americanization, of a 
new version of ICA. 
Scholars subsequently grounded new research on the arguments of Dezalay and Garth. 
Franck, for example, mentioned a “shift in the group serving as arbitrators, which has grown 
beyond the ‘grand old men’ to a younger generation of arbitration technocrats” to introduce 
her study of the “role” of international arbitrators (Franck 2006:500). Others have sought to 
update the conclusions of Dezalay and Garth in light of additional data. Schultz and Kovacs 
claim, on the basis of a survey of lawyers and arbitrators, that a “third generation of 
arbitrators” (the “Managers”) has now emerged (Schultz & Kovacs 2012). Arbitrators 
themselves have adopted terms employed by Dezalay and Garth, referring to what they do as 
“practicing virtue” (Caron et al. 2015). More generally, the prioritization of a small group of 
“lawyers that count” (Dezalay 2015:27)8 has had a strong influence on the ways in which 
socio-legal scholars have analyzed the significance of legal elites in globalization processes 
(Hagan et al. 2006; Sacriste & Vauchez 2007; Kauppi & Madsen 2013; Dezalay & Madsen 
2012; Shaffer et al. 2015). 
Dealing in Virtue has not only been highly influential, it has also gone largely 
unchallenged. Dezalay and Garth based their analysis on “almost three hundred interviews” 
(Dezalay & Garth 1996:9), making any challenge a daunting task.9 This paper is based on the 
                                                
8 See Puig (2014) for an application to investor-state arbitration. 
9 One early critique should be noted in this regard. A book reviewer of Dealing in Virtue, who happened to be a 
former Secretary-General of the ICC International Court of Arbitration, argued that “there [wa]s little basis, in 
[his] view, for the authors’ contention that conflict between an aging cadre of notables, i.e., ‘grand old men,’ and 
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analysis of new data that was specifically compiled to explore an alternative explanation. 
Dezalay and Garth emphasized incompatibilities between systems, tensions that produced 
what they portray as a zero-sum competition between two types of practitioners, which the 
common law technocrats won, and the grand old men of the civil law lost, in the 1980s and 
1990s. The basic structure of Dezalay and Garth’s argument is as follows: (i) ICA was 
dominated by professorial “grand old men” prior to the 1980s; (ii) “young technocrats,” 
trained in a litigious culture of the common law, became the prevailing elite of ICA thereafter; 
and (iii) this change in power drove the judicialization of ICA, that is, towards a full-fledged 
transnational substitute for national courts. This paper challenges each of these elements. The 
analysis indicates that the crucial period of institutional transformation took place between the 
1950s and 1970s, when ICA became dominated by “secant marginals” operating at the 
intersection of the legal systems and professions. The term, “secant marginals,” refers to those 
individuals who, while being members of multiple social groups (national, ethnic, 
professional), do not develop a sense of primary identity, or exclusive loyalty, with regard to 
any one of these groups. As a result, they are better able to develop the types of knowledge-
based power and legitimacy that enable them to become skilled brokers at the intersection 
between systems (Crozier & Friedberg 1977:86).  
In order to identify, and track the influence of, these agents, I compiled data on the 
composition of elites in ICA at different stages of historical development, before and after the 
time frame of Dezalay and Garth’s empirical research. The data show that the “secant 
marginals,” operating between 1950 and the 1970s, largely determined the modern evolution 
of ICA. They did so by building a hybrid system, made up of bridges that connected different 
legal systems and professions in the service of a common purpose: to reconstruct ICA by 
                                                                                                                                                   
a younger generation of ‘technocrats’ has helped to shape the modern development of international commercial 
arbitration” (Schwartz 1997:231). Among other reasons, Schwartz pointed out how “many of those prominent in 
international arbitration are at the same time academics and practitioners, which makes it even more difficult to 
speak of cleavage between the two.” (Schwartz 1997:232). 
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judicializing it. These actors engaged in intensive institutional “bricolage” (Lévi-Strauss 
1962), combining elements from different systems in order to create a system at once new and 
familiar. The central importance of the “secant marginals” in the construction of ICA is 
further confirmed by the fact that members of the current ICA elite – far from being “young 
technocrats” à la Dezalay and Garth – reproduced the features of their peers in the 1950s and 
1960s. The findings are consistent with empirical studies that have highlighted the 
“interdiscursive” structure of ICA, characterized by the blending of professional (and legal) 
practices (Bhatia 2011:80; Bhatia, Candlin & Gotti 2012). The empirics also provides further 
insights into the sources of a distinct, transnational “culture” for ICA which, Karton has 
argued, is today based on “a coherent set of norms outside of any national culture, in [a] 
discrete, international space” (Karton 2013: 10).  
Beyond the analysis of ICA lies another broader debate on the processes through 
which globalization has proceeded after the Second World War. Dezalay and Garth proposed 
a narrative of legal globalization “constructed by agents operating from clearly defined 
national home bases, a process which has implications both for the dynamics of the national 
as well as the emergent international legal field” (Buchanan 1997:365). In other words, the 
competition among approaches based on distinct legal traditions would eventually produce a 
set of dominant standards and practices which would, in turn, form the basis of a new 
globalized legal field. This narrative, which has been described as “the most consistently 
conceptualized and far-reaching examination[s] of the globalization of law to date” (Munger 
2012:476), privileges focus on the competition between various national approaches and 
actors (Legrand 2006:527; Merry 2006:3; Halliday 2012:267). I argue here that the 
construction of sites of global governance may also depend critically on those actors whose 
efficacy flows from their positions as skilled actors along systemic borders. This counter-
narrative emphasizes the importance of a stable, transnational interface between systems, 
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rather than the triumph of one logic of social power and legitimacy over another.10 With 
regard to the transformation of ICA, distinct systems did not matter as much as the 
instantiation of the new transnational space in which they intersect. Local elites usually do not 
fare well in the construction of such (once virtual, now real) spaces, precisely because 
loyalties are too obviously grounded in more parochial systems. 
 
Preliminary observations   
This paper argues that Dezalay and Garth over-emphasized conflict and competition, while 
failing to consider adequately the significance of the development of new modes of 
cooperation in the transformation of ICA. In particular, they fail to consider the extent to 
which new entrants into ICA self-consciously forged a new transnational hybrid from 
elements found in multiple legal traditions.  There are two sources of this problem: (i) the 
influence of the Bourdieusian analytical frame on Dezalay and Garth’s analysis, and (ii) the 
limitations of analyzing data collected almost exclusively through interviews. 
The Bourdieusian tradition 
Dezalay and Garth situate themselves within the strictures of a tradition founded by Bourdieu 
(Dezalay et al. 2015:20).11 In his foreword to Dealing in Virtue, Bourdieu emphasized the 
importance of conflicts between national traditions in the creation of a transnational legal 
field: 
[…] conflicts between jurists of different countries seeking to impose their judicial 
forms, or their modes of producing law, contribute to the progressive (and unfinished) 
unification of the global legal field and the global market of legal expertise. The 
international is constructed largely from the competition among national approaches. 
[…] This process makes the international the site of a regulatory competition between 
essentially national approaches. (Dezalay & Garth 1996:vii-viii). 
 
                                                
10 A distinction could be drawn in this regard between the “international,” which has been constructed by States, 
and the “transnational,” which involves a wider range of actors and institutions (Jessup 1956:3). 
11 Pierre Bourdieu was Yves Dezalay’s PhD supervisor (Dezalay 1992). Dezalay and Garth emphasized that they 
used Bourdieu’s “structural approach” as a “starting point” (Dezalay & Garth 1996:4).  
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Although Bourdieu did not apply his analytical frame to the analysis of the law (see, however, 
Bourdieu 1986; Bourdieu 2012:487-587; see also Dezalay & Madsen 2012; Lenoir 
2004b:231-253), his approach generally reflected this view of the dynamics of social change, 
whether applied to French schools (Bourdieu 1989), academic discourse (Bourdieu 1984), or 
governmental regulatory systems (Bourdieu 2012:275-346). Bourdieu’s analytical frame, 
which focuses on the battle between the “dominant” and the “dominated” as an engine of 
social evolution (Pinto 2002:53), has its roots in the Marxist analysis of class struggle (Lenoir 
2004a:146-8).12 
This bias in favor of conflict, more theory-driven than empirical, downplays the importance of 
cooperation to social change that have been explicated by other theorists (Axelrod 1990; Dixit 
2004:65-76). Since Dealing in Virtue appeared, institutional and economic sociology has 
experienced a broad revival leading to, among other things, a reconceptualization of the 
notion of the field and of the dynamics of field construction and maintenance. Most 
contemporary research begins from the standpoint that “both competition and cooperation are 
fundamental to field analysis” (Fligstein & McAdam 2012:24-26), and that “[f]ield stability is 
generally achieved in one of two ways: through the imposition of hierarchical power by a 
single dominant group or the creation of some kind of political coalition based on the 
cooperation of a number of groups” (Fligstein & McAdam 2012:14). This paper assesses the 
importance of factors associated with both.13 The objective is not to deny the importance of 
competition as an agent of social change but rather to simply illustrate how social strategies 
may borrow, in subtle ways, from cooperation and competition in processes that are often 
intertwined. This approach shifts the focus from competition to cooperation in a move that is 
equally informed by the self-interested maximization of the agents’ position within the field 
                                                
12 It should, however, be noted that Bourdieu distanced himself from the Marxist analysis, see Bourdieu (with 
Wacquand) 1992:219-21.  
13 Karton noted how Dezalay & Garth’s deductive approach, based on “a priori sociological models such as 
Bourdieu’s,” might have caused a distortion of reality (Karton 2013:38). 
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(Buchanan 1997:370). In particular, the article will show how professional groups that were 
deemed to be in competition have, in fact, blended into a unified, hybrid, legal profession at 
the transnational level. It will also show how the individuals working at the intersection of 
these various groups – the “secant marginals” – succeeded in constructing a cooperative 
(rather than uniquely competitive) interface between otherwise separate legal systems and 
professions, and had already begun to judicialize ICA in the 1950s. This process has unfolded 
on a larger temporal scale and in ways that have been, in my view, misinterpreted. 
Self-representations in international commercial arbitration 
Dezalay and Garth’s conclusions are based on interviews with practitioners of ICA carried 
over a three-year period in the 1990s (Dezalay & Garth 1996:9). Although Dezalay and Garth 
purport to capture the evolution of ICA over a twenty-year period, between the 1980s and the 
1990s (Dezalay & Garth 1996:61), they do not explore what took place prior to these decades. 
This paper argues that the crucial transformative period took place before the 1980s, and the 
data and qualitative research provide strong support for this contention. 
In addition, the exclusive recourse to interviews raises methodological issues in a domain, 
such as ICA, where the group of practitioners is portrayed as a closed “club” to which 
outsiders are eager to accede (Dezalay & Garth 1996:10). In this context, challengers have an 
interest in differentiating themselves from members of the dominant group and over-
emphasizing their differences with this group. Conversely, the incumbent group may have an 
interest in falsely portraying the challengers in order to preserve their dominant position; self-
representations may lead to strategic misrepresentations. In a recent interview, one of the 
authors noted that the “young technocrats” were not only more eager to participate in the 
interviewing process than the grand old men but that they also sought to artificially emphasize 
their differences from the “grand old men” and even “manipulate” the interviewing process 
(Dezalay et al. 2015:21-22). He further argued that the limited size of the object of inquiry 
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(ICA) and its “fluidity” made it difficult to have recourse to quantitative methods (Dezalay et 
al. 2015: 26). The present article seeks to re-balance the “objectivist” and “subjectivist” 
approaches by introducing quantitative data (based on archival research) associated with 
qualitative analysis (based on individual profiling).  
These preliminary observations suggest that: (i) a study of the evolution of ICA arbitration 
should be temporally broader than twenty years in order to faithfully account for long-term 
evolution; (ii) data collection should include direct evidence of sociological change (and not 
focus solely on indirect evidence); and (iii) the analysis should consider the importance of 
factors and interactions related to both conflict and cooperation.14  
 
Presentation of the data 
One of the key difficulties of the research on ICA arises from the confidentiality of arbitral 
proceedings and the difficulty in accessing evidence pertaining to the long-term evolution of 
the field (Bathia 2010:469-479). The present article relies on two datasets in order to provide 
a more fine-grained sociological picture of ICA over a long-term period. Analysis of these 
data enable the assessment of events that unfolded prior to the 1980s, and to assess their 
effects afterwards. The first dataset provides strong support for the view that the leading 
figures at the ICC, operating prior to 1972, acted at the intersection of various social groups, 
as “secant marginals” in the transformation of ICA. Analysis of the second dataset shows that 
the leading arbitrators identified by Dezalay and Garth as the young technocrats actually 
reproduced the sociological features of these “secant marginals.”.  
I compiled the first dataset through archival research at the ICC, the leading institution in 
ICA, and the main case study of Dezalay and Garth (Dezalay & Garth 1996:13). The ICC has 
                                                
14 It is noteworthy in this regard that in a recent paper, Dezalay and Garth broadened the temporal horizon of 
their study and stressed – on the basis of archival research – the possible “alliances” between “fractions of 
national elites whose interests converge or whose resources are complementary” (Dezalay & Garth 
forthcoming).  
 10 
administered proceedings since the creation of its “Court of Arbitration” in the early 1920s. 
The ICC Court of Arbitration15 appoints arbitrators, chooses cities in which arbitration 
proceedings are seated, and scrutinizes draft awards. It has, over nearly a century, been the 
leading institution in ICA. Dezalay and Garth described the ICC as a “central institution” and 
the “most universal of the arbitration institutions” (Dezalay & Garth 1996:45). Today, it is 
still the most global institution, when considered in terms of the national diversity of parties 
and arbitrators (Stone Sweet & Grisel 2017:45-46).16 I gathered information on more than a 
thousand appointments of arbitrators, in 644 ICC cases resolved between 1922 and 1973, on 
which archival data was available.17 Cases after 1973 were not made available for 
confidentiality reasons. I coded for arbitrators, gender, nationality, date of birth, profession, 
and whether they were nominated for the first time. This dataset provides key information on 
ICC arbitrators immediately prior to the time period studied by Dezalay and Garth.  
The second dataset extends the empirical research, both temporally and materially, and places 
the first dataset into broader perspective. Most important, it allows us to identify the social 
strategies that would eventually prevail among ICA elites, putting the conclusions drawn from 
the first dataset to the test of time. This dataset is based on the Who’s Who List of the Most-
Highly Regarded Individuals in Commercial Arbitration (2015).18 This list was established on 
the basis of a yearly survey of the individuals who were ranked most highly by arbitration 
users and actors in 2015. As such, it provides a picture of the most successful and recognized 
individuals in ICA today. For each of these 25 individuals, I gathered information pertaining 
to their genders, nationalities, and dates of birth. I also determined whether they were 
                                                
15 The Court of Arbitration was renamed the “International Court of Arbitration” in 1998.  
16 It is acknowledged that the sociological profile of arbitrators in other leading arbitral institutions (for instance, 
the London Court of International Arbitration or the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce) may differ from the 
present data. 
17 These cases were resolved either by decision of the arbitrators or by settlement between the disputing parties.  
18 This list is available at <http://whoswholegal.com/news/analysis/article/32630/arbitration-2016-analysis/> 
(last accessed 17 August 2016). 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attorneys or barristers, whether they had any significant academic activity,19 and whether they 
had any significant affiliation with a leading arbitral institution.20 This information concerns 
ICA elites beyond the time period analyzed by Dezalay and Garth.  
 
Analysis of the data and discussion 
“Grand old men” versus “secant marginals”? 
The first dataset provides an exhaustive picture of the individuals who were nominated as 
arbitrators in ICC cases from 1922 to 1973. To identify the most prominent members of this 
community, I selected the names of arbitrators who obtained more than 10 appointments 
during this time period. The list of these names, which is given in Table 1, provides a picture 
of the “grand old men” approximately 20 years before Dealing in Virtue. Altogether, these 
“grand old men” gathered 142 appointments, more than 10% of the total number of 
arbitrators’ appointments between 1922 and 1973. Their average age was 61.2 years old, with 
a standard deviation of 4 years (in 197321). None of the individuals who had obtained 10 or 
more appointments acted as arbitrators prior to 1945. 
--------------------- 
Table 1 about here 
---------------------- 
A review of the individual profiles provides relevant insights on the backgrounds of the 
“grand old men.” Most were not established elites of a national legal system, or national 
professional association, and were highly unlikely to promote “their” own vernacular 
                                                
19 I considered several factors to establish the existence of a “significant academic activity,” including the 
number of scientific publications in specialized reviews, any affiliation with universities or law schools and 
memberships in scientific societies.  
20 I considered only individuals who held an official position in one of the leading arbitral institutions 
(International Chamber of Commerce, London Court of International Arbitration, Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce, American Arbitration Association, Dubai International Arbitration Centre, Singapore International 
Arbitration Centre, Hong Kong International Arbitration Center, and China International Economic and Trade 
Arbitration Commission).  
21 Ernest Barda died in 1966. 
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approaches. On the contrary, they appeared to be travelers, often migrants, who cultivated 
professional eclecticism across borders. These arbitrators fit the profile of “secant marginals” 
(Crozier & Friedberg 1977:86), whose legitimacy is rather weak in specific systems but who 
are able to mediate in the interstices between systems. They are also symmetrically opposed 
to the Bourdieusian “grand old men” who solidly belong to one of these systems, do not wish 
to extract themselves therefrom, and aggressively sing the praises of their system(s) externally 
(Crozier & Friedberg 1977:220). These “marginals” compare well with the “first-order 
intermediaries” who mediated the “global/local encounter” in bankruptcy law (Carruthers & 
Hallidays 2006:529-532). They can also be likened with the intermediaries who translated 
local grievances in the parlance of global human rights in Hong Kong (Merry 2006:193-194, 
210-212). However, contrary to these intermediaries, the leading arbitrators at the ICC held 
significant power in their own constructed space but rarely in the local spaces from which 
they drew aspects of their legitimacy. While they were particularly effective when circulating 
within their own transnational space, they were less so when crossing local spaces (although 
they were sufficiently equipped to mediate between these spaces).  
The role of “secant marginals” in the construction of a transnational space is not specific to 
ICA. In fact, other transnational spaces have been constructed in similar ways. For instance, 
Tarrius showed that migratory flows and associated economic activity benefited from the 
intervention of “unofficial notaries,” whose mediation between local authorities, ethnic 
groups, and semi-criminal networks created the possibility for transnational governance of 
migration to emerge in southern Europe (Tarrius 2008:176-178). “Unofficial notaries,” as 
with leading arbitrators at the ICC, played a mediating role by nurturing various associations 
with distinct groups while limiting their loyalty to any of them. I will further illustrate the 
argument by analyzing individual trajectories of these arbitrators. 
 
 13 
- Travelers and migrants  
Many of the people in Table 1 were travelers and migrants who carried multiple legal 
identities and cultures. Ernest Barda was an Italian attorney who was born in Egypt and 
studied and practiced law in France. He wrote his doctoral dissertation under the supervision 
of Professor Lévy-Ullmann on “Specific performance or performance ‘in specie’ in the 
contracts of comparative English law” and was an active member of the Société de législation 
comparée22 from 1928 until his death in 1966.23 Ernst Mezger was an attorney who left 
Germany for France after the Nazi rise to power because of his Jewish origins. Heinrich 
Meierhof (who changed his name to Henri Monneray) fled Germany in 1933 for the same 
reasons before studying law in Paris, becoming a deputy prosecutor at the Nuremberg trials 
and an attorney in Paris after the Second World War.24 In the late 1940s, he published two 
volumes of documents (based on materials used in Nuremberg) on the persecutions of Jews 
throughout Europe during the Second World War.25 He was an expert for France in a case 
brought before the International Court of Justice in the late 1950s.26 Berthold Goldman was a 
French professor who was born in Bucharest in 1913, left Romania for France in 1930, 
became a law professor (with a first academic position held in “Indochina”) and ended up 
presiding over the University of Paris II from 1974 until 1979.27 Lazare Kopelmanas was born 
in Lithuania in 1907, studied law in Switzerland and France, taught in France, the United 
States, the Netherlands and Switzerland, and worked as an international civil servant at the 
                                                
22 The Société de Législation Comparée is a scientific society based in Paris devoted to the study of comparative 
law and foreign law. It has consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, the 
International Labour Office and the Council of Europe, see <http://www.legiscompare.fr/web/Presentation-de- 
la-SLC> (last accessed 18 August 2016).  
23 See Marc Ancel (1967) “Ernest Barda,” 19/3 Revue internationale de droit comparé 702. 
24 See Laura Jockusch (2007) ““Collect and Record! Help to Write the History of the Latest Destruction!” Jewish 
Historical Commissions in Europe, 1943-1953.” Ph.D. diss., Department of Hebrew and Judaic Studies, New 
York University, 479. 
25 See Henri Monneray (1947) La Persécution des Juifs en France et dans les Autres Pays de l’Ouest. Paris: Ed. 
du Centre; Henri Monneray (1949) La Persécution des Juifs dans les Pays de l’Est. Paris: Ed. du Centre. 
26 See Case of Certain Norwegian Loans, Judgment of July 6th, 1957: I.C.J. Reports 1957, p. 9, p. 6. 
27 See Jean-Denis Bredin (2004), “Berthold Goldman, toujours vivant,” in Philippe Fouchard et al., eds., 
L’actualité de la pensée de Berthold Goldman (Paris: Editions Panthéon-Assas), 15-18. 
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United Nations Office in Geneva.28 Although Paul van Reepinghen spent most of his career in 
Belgium, his activity as an international arbitrator earned him the Order of Merit of the Italian 
Republic.29 The same is true of Ottoarndt Glossner, who spent most of his career in Germany, 
while studying law in Germany, France and the UK and obtaining the French Legion of 
Honor in 1993.30  
These individuals did not draw their authority from their national positions, contrary to the 
claim that they had “risen to the top of their national legal professions and gained financial 
independence before asked to serve as arbitrators” (Dezalay & Garth 1996:35). In fact, some 
of them were rather unknown in their respective countries, and their local careers occasionally 
suffered as a result of their migrations and travels. Ernest Barda, Ernst Mezger and Henri 
Monneray (all immigrants) were leading arbitrators at the ICC, but they failed to achieve 
distinction as local attorneys. Similarly, Lazare Kopelmanas, Pierre-Jean Pointet and Paul van 
Reepinghen were not very influential in their respective countries. Of course, all these 
arbitrators carried some form of social influence, but they were not the power brokers of the 
kind described as the “grand old men.” Even Berthold Goldman, who showed all the signs of 
social prestige in France (and was described as a prime example of “grand old man” by 
Dezalay and Garth (Dezalay & Garth 1996:53)), was hit by a wave of anti-Semitism and 
racism (as a naturalized French who was Jewish and born in Romania) in response to his 
appointment as president of the University of Paris II in 1974.31 Compare the national profile 
of these arbitrators with that of international judges. The judges at the International Court of 
                                                
28 See Lazare Kopelmanas (1976), “L’application du droit national aux sociétés multinationales,” in Collected 
Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law, Vol. 150 (Leiden/Boston: Brill/Nijhoff), 298. 
29 Email from Mr. Laurent van Reepinghen dated 13 July 2016. 
30 Alain Plantey et al., eds. (1994) Festschrift für Ottoarndt Glossner zum 70. Geburtstag (Heidelberg: Verlag 
Recht und Wirtschaft), 6. 
31 See Jean-Denis Bredin (2004), “Berthold Goldman, toujours vivant,” in Philippe Fouchard et al., eds., 
L’actualité de la pensée de Berthold Goldman (Paris: Editions Panthéon-Assas), 15-18. 
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Justice (ICJ) typically display high levels of social capital in their respective countries,32 in 
contrast to the individuals listed in Table 1.  
Some of the latter displayed more traditional profiles grounded in national legal traditions, but 
these were more the exception than the rule. Two individuals in Table 1, who were both 
judges in their countries of origin (Sweden and Switzerland), match that profile. The first, 
André Panchaud, was a judge at the Swiss Federal Tribunal from 1948 until 1970, over which 
he presided in 1967 and 1968.33 The second, Gunnar Lagergren, was a Swedish judge who 
presided over the Court of Appeal for Western Sweden between 1966 and 1977, before 
heading the administration of the Royal Court of Sweden (Marshal of the Realm) until 1982.34 
Lagergren subsequently became a judge at the European Court of Human Rights (1977-1988) 
and the first president of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal (1981-1984).35 Lagergren was 
associated by marriage with one of the most influential families in Sweden (the Wallenberg 
family).36 He became the first chairman of the Raoul Wallenberg Institute for Human Rights 
and Humanitarian Law.37 In addition, the Wallenberg family has had a longstanding 
involvement with the ICC (Dezalay & Garth 1996:188).  Knut A. Wallenberg – a former 
Swedish Foreign Minister – was involved in the creation of the ICC in the early 1920s,38 and 
subsequently became one of its Vice-Presidents.39 His nephew, Marcus Wallenberg, Jr., 
                                                
32 For instance, the judges appointed by France at the ICJ were all high-level public officials in this country (3 
out of 5 were members of the Conseil d’Etat, the Supreme Administrative Court; and the remaining 2 came from 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Similarly, the judges appointed by the United Kingdom were all prominent 
professors, barristers or members of the Foreign Service (4 out of 7 held the prestigious Whewell Professorship 
at Cambridge University or the Chichele Professorship at Oxford University).  
33 See Lucienne Hubler (2009) “André Panchaud” in Dictionnaire historique de la Suisse (available at 
<http://www.hls-dhs-dss.ch/textes/f/F16254.php>, last accessed 10 April 2017). 
34 See Gunnar Lagergren & George H. Aldrich (2002) “An Old Judge Remembers,” 14 Leiden J. of International 
Law 307. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. (His wife, Nina von Dardel, was Raoul Wallenberg’s step-sister.) 
37 See “History,” Raoul Wallenberg Institute for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (available at 
<http://rwi.lu.se/about/history/>, last accessed 10 April 2017). 
38 See International Chamber of Commerce, Brochure No. 13 (First Congress, June 27 to July 1, 1921) (Paris: 
ICC) 
39 See International Chamber of Commerce, Brochure No. 31 (Resolutions Adopted at the Second Congress, 
March 1923) (Paris: ICC). (International Commercial Arbitration – Practical Hints  
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served as an alternate member of the ICC Council in the 1930s.40 The connection between 
Lagergren and the ICC through the Wallenberg family might explain his ease at gathering 
appointments as an arbitrator. Indeed, Lagergren himself reported his repeated connections 
with the ICC: 
The ICC had its headquarters in Paris. It carried on extensive arbitration activities 
concerning international conflicts, and when the parties could not agree on the choice 
of a chairman they applied to the national committees in different countries for 
suggestions. When Sweden was asked I was often suggested, so I went to Paris 
repeatedly as arbitrator. There I also became familiar with the other activities of the 
International Chamber of Commerce and for some reason I established contact 
particularly with a group whose business was international trade terminology for 
freights, things called ‘fob’ and ‘cif’ etc. I became a member of that group and after 
some time its chairman. We published a collection of definitions of these terms, 
‘Incoterms.’ All the time I was also nominated as an arbitrator. (Lagergren & Aldrich 
2002:311). 
 
While belonging to the Swedish elite, Lagergren showed an ability to bridge different cultural 
and legal approaches (rather than his own national approach) when deciding commercial 
disputes. He rendered, for example, an oft-cited award in ICC Case No. 1110, a dispute 
brought by an Argentine individual against a British company for the payment of 
commissions.41 While dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction in 1963, Lagergren did not 
refer to a national law, but to the “good morals and international public policy” that prohibited 
the “bribing of Argentine officials for the purpose of obtaining the hoped-for business.”42 In 
doing so, he applied an overarching set of transnational norms and values (later named 
“transnational public policy”) which he believed were common to the national legal systems 
at stake. In similar ways, Berthold Goldman was dubbed the “father” of the lex mercatoria, a 
set of global rules cutting across national legal systems that is applied – according to Goldman 
and others – to ICA (Goldman 1964). 
                                                
40 See International Chamber of Commerce (1935) International Commercial Arbitration – Practical Hints 
(Paris: ICC). 
41 See “Argentine Engineer v. British Company, Award, ICC Case No. 1110,” (1994) 3 Arbitration International 
282-294. 
42 Id. 
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Like Lagergren and Goldman, most of the individuals listed in Table 1 were successful as 
arbitrators because they were able to navigate between different legal systems, and to 
harmonize approaches that would otherwise remain in tension. Ernest Barda’s obituary in the 
Bulletin de la Société de Législation Comparée emphasized that he “did a lot for the 
reconciliation between continental and Anglo-American conceptions, and even more to 
promote an efficient cooperation between Italian lawyers and French lawyers.”43 My point is 
that these individuals were part of a transnational elite; they did not depend on skills 
developed in national practice, but rather built their social power and legitimacy at the 
intersections of boundaries and traditions. These technical skills often came from their 
personal histories, educations, and career experiences across borders.  
- Professional eclecticism 
In addition to reconciling different national approaches, these arbitrators showed an ability to 
accumulate different professional activities, layering expertise that would help them manage 
the hybridization process that would subsequently unfold (as described further below). All 
these arbitrators had a main professional activity to which they added their activities as 
arbitrators. However, most of them also engaged in other professional activities as well. 
Ernest Barda’s main profession was that of an attorney, but he also nurtured a strong 
academic interest through his involvement with the Société de législation comparée. Ernst 
Mezger was also a lawyer, but was involved with several academic societies as well, 
including the Institut de droit comparé at the University of Paris II (where he ended up 
teaching) and the Comité français de droit international privé (of which he became the vice 
president).44 Although many arbitrators had a strong interest in academic life, they were not 
“professional academics” in the sense that they did not draw regular income from a permanent 
                                                
43 See Marc Ancel (1967) "Ernest Barda," 19/3 Revue internationale de droit comparé 702. 
44 See Otto Sandrock (1991) “Nachruf auf Ernst Mezger,” 90 ZVglRWiss 307-312. 
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position in a university or law school. As will be shown further below, modern arbitrators 
have followed the steps of these pioneers by cumulating different professional features.  
The prototypes of hybridization were Paul van Reepinghen and Lazare Kopelmanas, who led 
parallel activities over their entire careers. Van Reepinghen obtained the most important 
number (28) of appointments as an arbitrator between 1922 and 1973. He was neither a 
professor nor an attorney but headed the legal department of the Federation of Belgian 
Industries (which later became the Federation of Belgian Enterprises in 1973), the main 
employers’ confederation representing business interests in Belgium.45 Right from the 
beginning, the ICC sought to build ties with organizations such as the Federation of Belgian 
Industries,46 and it is likely that Paul van Reepinghen established strong connections with the 
ICC through that organization. In addition, he specialized in intellectual property law, and 
became the head of the International Association for the Protection of Intellectual Property’s 
Belgian chapter, the leading organization “dedicated to the development and improvement of 
laws for the protection of intellectual property.”47 Under the auspices of the Federation of 
Belgian Industries, he later founded and headed the CEPANI (the Belgian Centre for 
Arbitration and Mediation) from 1969 until 1974.48 Van Reepinghen does not appear to have 
participated in any academic activity, nor was he affiliated with a law firm. And he does not 
match Dezalay and Garth’s profile of the “grand old man,” who drew intellectual prestige and 
charisma out of his academic position and did not display strong technical skills (Dezalay & 
Garth 1996:34-35). Instead, his appointments were due to his connections with the business 
world, and his expertise in intellectual property law.  
                                                
45 Email from Mr. Laurent van Reepinghen dated 13 July 2016. 
46 See International Chamber of Commerce 1935:7: “In March 1935, its organization members numbered 868 
Chambers of commerce, manufacturing associations, industrial organizations, banking unions, transport bodies, 
etc., belonging to 46 countries, in 32 of which they were represented by National Committees, a list of which 
appears on the cover.”  
47 See ‘About AIPPI’ <http://aippi.org> (last accessed 16 August 2016).  
48 Email from Mr. Laurent van Reepinghen dated 13 July 2016. 
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Lazare Kopelmanas too displayed a hybrid profile. He was mainly an international civil 
servant, working as a legal advisor to the United Nations in Geneva from 1949 until 1977.49 
In this capacity, he advised the United Nations throughout the negotiations that led to the 
European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (1961).50 In addition, he 
constantly had stints in various universities around the world: the Centre National de la 
Recherche Scientifique in France (1945-1949), the Hague Academy of International Law 
(1950, 1957-1958, 1976), Yale Law School (1957-1958), the University of Paris (1960-1962), 
and the University of Geneva (1971-1973).51 Although Kopelmanas never held a permanent 
professorship in any of these institutions (and therefore could not draw prestige from his 
academic activities in a local context), his ability to navigate and teach in different legal 
systems built his legitimacy as a transnational legal expert. As will be shown below, hybrid 
profiles such as those of Kopelmanas and Van Reepinghen have become a stable feature 
among commercial arbitrators. 
- Professional diversity 
The data set also contains information on appointments by profession. Graph 1 provides a 
breakdown of these cumulative numbers by profession (attorneys, judges, members of trade 
federations, professors, and international civil servants).  
--------------------- 
Graph 1 about here 
---------------------- 
Graph 1 shows that law professors were not the dominating group among top ICC arbitrators. 
In fact, attorneys held the most important share of all appointments (30%). In addition, several 
                                                
49 See Lazare Kopelmanas (1976), “L’application du droit national aux sociétés multinationales,” in Collected 
Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law, Vol. 150 (Leiden/Boston: Brill/Nijhoff), 298. 
50 See Ottoarndt Glossner (1995), “Institutionelle Schiedsrichterernennung – Das Besondere Komité des 
Europäischen Übereinkommens über die Handlesschiedsgerichtsbarkeit von Genf vom 21. April 1961,” in 
Friedrich Graf von Westphalen et al., eds., Lebendiges Recht – Von den Sumerern bis zur Gegenwart – 
Festschrift für Reinhold Trinkner zum 65. Geburtstag (Heidelberg: Verlag Recht und Wirtschaft), 555. 
51 See Lazare Kopelmanas (1976), “L’application du droit national aux sociétés multinationales,” in Collected 
Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law, Vol. 150 (Leiden/Boston: Brill/Nijhoff), 298. 
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other legal professions (judges, members of trade federations, international civil servants) 
were represented among the pool of arbitrators. In an early review of Dealing in Virtue, an 
arbitration insider (who would later become the Chairman of the ICC International Court of 
Arbitration) stressed that Dezalay and Garth had missed the fact that the older generation too 
drew their symbolic capital out of “long experience as contentious lawyers,” and that some of 
them “developed academic careers to complement their roles as active practitioners” 
(Beechey 1997:573). An analysis of the “grand old men” based on an exhaustive review of 
ICC cases between 1922 and 1973 therefore confirms that their overlapping identities were 
much more diverse and complex than the figure of the old continental professor identified by 
Dezalay and Garth, who had built power and legitimacy on a local status and prestige. On the 
contrary, many of these “grand old men” were not powerful in their national systems, not 
least, because they were immigrants. Their transnational legitimacy was rooted in the 
ambiguous, complex identity of the marginal who is skilled at working “in between” different 
systems, and fashioning new ones. 
 
The evolution of ICC arbitration 
Having offered a snapshot of these “grand old men,” let us now consider the big picture: the 
distribution of all appointments at the ICC between 1922 and 1972. Graph 2 presents a picture 
of these appointments divided into 5 sub-periods and broken down by profession. 
------------------------ 
Graph 2 about here 
-------------------------- 
- The judicialization of ICC arbitration  
Graph 2 confirms several conclusions drawn from Table 1 and Graph 1. Professors were only 
a minority among all appointees, even though their relative weight steadily grew over time. 
 21 
Graph 2 also confirms that attorneys were the dominant group among ICC arbitrators after the 
Second World War, and that their relative importance also increased. Conversely, the 
proportion of engineers/experts, businessmen/corporate executives and members of trade 
federations/unions dropped to insignificant levels. When considering the last sub-period 
(1963-1972), attorneys, judges and professors accounted for more than 74% of all 
appointments. In other words, the influence of legal specialists grew over time to the point 
where business specialists held only a small share of all appointments.  
The growing influence of legal specialists can be considered a sign of the steady 
judicialization that ICA incurred through the twentieth century (Grisel et al. 2016; Stone 
Sweet & Grisel 2017). As the financial stakes of business disputes grew, and as parties 
became increasingly sophisticated, the demand for legal expertise and consistency also grew. 
This can be observed, for instance, in the growing length of ICC procedural rules, which 
progressively expanded to anticipate a broader range of procedural difficulties (Stone Sweet 
& Grisel 2017). Dezalay and Garth argued that the judicialization of arbitration occurred in 
the 1980s, when “young technocrats” arrived to Continental Europe with Anglo-American 
law firms, bringing with them the baggage of litigation techniques borrowed from common 
law systems (Dezalay & Garth 1996:54-57). However, Anglo-American law firms were 
already heavily invested in ICC arbitration prior to the 1970s,52 and several arbitrators were 
affiliated with barrister chambers in London.53 In addition, leading arbitrators commonly 
sought to build bridges between the common law and civil law traditions through comparative 
analysis.54 
                                                
52 This involvement was twofold: these firms represented parties in ICC proceedings, and some arbitrators were 
attorneys in these firms. I counted 4 prominent English solicitors’ firms and 2 prominent US law firms. All these 
firms (or their successors) currently have successful arbitration practices.  
53 I counted at least 3 barrister chambers.  
54 For instance, Lazare Kopelmanas taught in the United States (Yale Law School), Ottoarndt Glossner studied in 
the United Kingdom (Liverpool), and Ernest Barda wrote his doctoral dissertation on specific performance under 
English law. 
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In fact, many of the historical figures of arbitration in the common law world presented the 
same hybrid features as the leading arbitrators in Table 1. For instance, Martin Domke is a 
prime example of a “secant marginal,” whose career blossomed in the common law world.55 
Domke was born and educated as a lawyer in Germany, before fleeing Nazi persecution for 
France and then the USA.56 He later became an adjunct-Professor of Law at New York 
University and the Vice-President (and Director of Legal Research) of the American 
Arbitration Association.57 His “unique role” in the development of ICA was described in 1967 
as one of “a comparative lawyer of considerable distinction,” associated with “the shrewd 
down-to-earth salesman of a valuable commodity as yet too little known but capable of being 
proved superior to its competitors.”58 
Several towering figures in the United Kingdom shared similar career trajectories.  Clive 
Schmitthoff grew, studied and worked in Germany before moving to the United Kingdom and 
becoming a prominent law professor who theorized – at the same time as Berthold Goldman, 
but across the Channel – the lex mercatoria.59 Even more striking is the case of Michael Kerr, 
a German refugee who climbed the social ladder of British legal elites to become a successful 
barrister and judge, and the first president of the London Court of International Arbitration in 
1985.60 Kerr thought that his foreign origin was a “crucial characteristic which could not be 
shaken off or ignored” throughout his career in England.61   
                                                
55 Other examples include Andreas Lowenfeld (born in Germany) and Hans Smit (born in the Netherlands), who 
were both actively involved in legal academia (with professorships at New York University and Columbia 
University) and legal practice (as international arbitrators). They both cultivated a strong interest for comparative 
law.  
56 Certified Award rendered by the Claims Resolution Tribunal In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation Case 
No. CV96-4849 (in re Accounts of Martin Domke) on August 31, 2005. 
57 See Eugenio Minoli et al. (1967), “Introduction,” in P. Sanders, ed., International Arbitration – Liber 
Amicorum for Martin Domke (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff), vii. 
58 Ibid. 
59 See John N. Adams (2004) “Clive M. Schmitthoff (1903-1990),” in J. Beatson et al., ed., Jurists Uprooted: 
German-Speaking Emigré in Twentieth Century Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
60 See Michael Kerr (2002) As Far as I Remember (Oxford/Portland: Hart Publishing), 324.  
61 Id., 239: “[…] in yesterday’s England a foreign origin was a crucial characteristic which could not be shaken 
off or ignored. Despite our naturalisations, Judy and I would never have been considered for any job in the 
Foreign or Diplomatic Service, and I used to worry whether the same might secretly apply to becoming a QC or 
a judge. In the end it didn’t. But perhaps nearly: I was once told in 1972 that I was the first foreign-born High 
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This cross-fertilization of the civil law/common law systems can also be seen in the 
emergence of arbitral procedures that have been in large part harmonized (through procedural 
transplants from the common and civil law traditions) rather than Americanized (Helmer 
2003; Jemielnak 2017). This process is a measure of the judicialization, a process that began 
to unfold decades before the period emphasized by Dezalay and Garth. To take just one 
obvious example, ICA’s hybrid evidentiary system accreted long before the 1980s, through 
the blending of the civil law tradition, which takes a restrictive stance towards discovery, with 
the common law tradition, where judges possess the power to compel disclosure (Stone Sweet 
& Grisel 2017:98-99). This “institutional bricolage” led to the creation of a sui generis 
procedure, called “document production.” The system, widely used in ICA, has been 
described as “one of the most remarkable examples of a merger between different … 
procedural approaches.”62 Dezalay and Garth interpreted the “emphasis on fact-finding” as a 
sign of the “Americanization” of international arbitration (Dezalay & Garth 1996:62). In fact, 
they observed a middle point in an institution-building process already underway.  
In this context, “secant marginals” are particularly well-equipped to cherry-pick and combine 
elements drawn from diverse legal traditions. Consider for example the debates surrounding 
the lex mercatoria in the 1960s. Dezalay and Garth interpreted the lex mercatoria as a 
doctrinal construction of the “grand old men” from France and Switzerland, who sought to 
preserve their “corporatist control over the profession” by promoting the application of a less 
formal system of arbitration based largely on equity (Dezalay & Garth 1996:39-42). In fact, 
prior to the 1960s, most ICC awards were rendered on the basis of equity and trade usages 
(rather than formal legal norms) (Grisel et al. 2016:428-429). It is in this context that “secant 
marginals” based in civil law and common law countries (Berthold Goldman in France, and 
                                                                                                                                                   
Court judge to have been appointed since the time when some Norman judges were brought over from France in 
the reign of Henry II.” 
62 Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, “Globalization of Arbitral Procedure,” (2003) 36 Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 1313, 1325. 
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Clive Schmitthoff in England), began to design the lex mercatoria as a global set of legal 
norms, drawn from the main legal systems.63 Their goal was to apply a set of general 
principles of law (often through the formalization of trade usages), rather than equity, to the 
merits of the disputes submitted to ICA (Stone Sweet & Grisel 2017:80-118). Dezalay and 
Garth saw remnants of an equity-based system ran by “grand old men,” but seemed to have 
missed entirely the efforts of theorists and practitioners of the lex mercatoria to build an 
autonomous and inherently legal order in order to make ICA a true substitute for courts – way 
before the 1980s. These findings confirm, dispositively in my view, that the judicialization 
process did not result from the “victory” of common lawyers and their subsequent domination 
of the field, but from a broader process that unfolded over a longer temporal scale. 
 
- The emergence of an ICC “arbitration club” 
Another striking aspect of ICC arbitration is the growing importance of arbitrators’ re-
appointments, a direct indicator of membership in the elite “club.” To track the practice of re-
appointments over time, I compiled data on the respective proportion of first appointments 
and re-appointments between 1922 and 1972, broken down into 5 sub-periods. I also added 
the number of all appointments (whether first appointments or re-appointments) for each sub-
period in Graph 3. 
---------------------- 
Graph 3 about here 
----------------------- 
                                                
63 Pieter Sanders described the lex mercatoria as “principles common to the law of civilised nations” in 1967. 
See Pieter Sanders, “Recent Developments in International Commercial Arbitration” (available at < 
http://www.arbitration-icca.org/media/0/12119973498790/002.pdf >, last checked 19 April 2017). He also gave 
a speech at the ICC Commission on International Arbitration on 6 May 1968, on the “role of arbitration in 
developing international trade law,” where he made recommendations to the ICC on how to develop the lex 
mercatoria (see ICC Document N° 420/162).  
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Graph 3 charts the proportion of re-appointments, which has grown steadily after the Second 
World War, reaching almost 50% of all appointments during the last sub-period (1963-1972). 
One explanation for this growing practice was the rapid development of ICC arbitration after 
the Second World War and the need to constitute tribunals quickly.64 These constraints 
naturally led to the appointment of those who were known to the ICC (or to the disputing 
parties). Another explanation is the growing practice of financial compensation for the 
arbitrators’ work (see Grisel et al. 2016:411, 431-2), which created an incentive for arbitrators 
to be re-appointed.  
In either case, the importance of re-appointments is key to understanding the emergence of a 
club of arbitrators. The chances of an individual to draw income and prestige from re-
appointments grew significantly once he (and more rarely, she65) had already been appointed. 
As a consequence, it became critical for these individuals to belong to the “arbitrators’ club,” 
i.e., the group of individuals who enjoyed frequent re-appointments. Arbitrators who wanted 
to belong to the “club” used different techniques to obtain re-appointments: they emphasized 
their differences (and, hence, their comparative advantage) with the “grand old men” (as 
reported by Dezalay and Garth) while mimicking features that had brought success to the 
same.  In particular, they sought to cumulate different professional affiliations that signaled 
their ability to navigate across different legal systems and build transnational legitimacy, just 
as the “grand old men” had done in the past. The second dataset provides key information on 
the sociological features of the “young technocrats” 20 years later. This dataset shows that the 
hybrid features of leading arbitrators – which appeared between the 1950s and 1970s – have 
been reproduced over time.  
 
                                                
64 It should be noted that most arbitrators were appointed by the ICC Court of Arbitration and that some of them 
were appointed by the disputing parties themselves.  
65 I noted the names of two women (both attorneys) who were appointed arbitrators during this time period. One 
was appointed only once, and the other one was appointed several times.  
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Hybridization and birth of a legal profession  
The second dataset is based on information supplied by the Who’s Who List of the Most 
Highly Regarded Individuals in Commercial Arbitration (2015).66 These individuals are 
routinely appointed as arbitrators in commercial disputes (at the ICC or elsewhere), and some 
also have a substantial practice as attorneys in ICA. This second dataset is not specific to the 
ICC but cuts across the different practices of ICA.67 As such, it provides a sociological picture 
of the most successful individuals who currently operate in this field, and allows us to put the 
findings drawn from the first dataset to a temporal test. To a large extent, these individuals 
embody the current leadership of today’s “club.” 
------------------------- 
Table 2 about here 
------------------------- 
The second dataset reflects the capacity of the new leaders to navigate across various 
practices and legal systems (Bhatia 2011:80; Bhatia, Candlin & Gotti 2012), and provides 
support for the view that professional “hybridization” in ICA has taken place. The 25 
individuals in Table 2 present common sociological features: all come from or live in the 
developed world, roughly all are the same age (with an average of 61 years old and a standard 
deviation of 8.85 years68), and they generally have elite educational backgrounds. For 
instance, eight of them hold (at least) one degree from the following four universities: Oxford, 
                                                
66 The methodology for establishing this list is described as follows on the Who’s Who website: “This year’s 
edition identifies world-class practitioners in 89 countries – a wider geographical spread than ever before, which 
reflects the ever-growing use and sophistication of international arbitration. In total, we list 812 arbitrators and 
counsel from 481 firms as leaders in this field; in this section we pick out the firms with the most listed lawyers 
in order, as well as the individuals who scored most highly in our voting.” (see 
<http://whoswholegal.com/news/analysis/article/32630/arbitration-2016-analysis/>, last checked on 21 August 
2016).  
67 In this regard, the recent decision of the ICC International Court of Arbitration to publish the names of its 
arbitrators opens avenues for future research. 
68 Their age is roughly the same as the individuals listed in Table 1 (61.2 years old with a standard deviation of 4 
years).  
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Cambridge, Yale, or Harvard.69 Another striking aspect is the domination of men over this 
global elite (23 out of 25 individuals). 
This domination is not new. My data on the ICC arbitrators nominated between 1922 and 
1973 shows five appointments of only two female arbitrators (over more than a thousand 
appointments of arbitrators during the same time period). None of these two women were part 
of the list of elite arbitrators set out in Table 1. In addition, these women did not share the 
features of the “secant marginals.”70 By contrast, the two female arbitrators in Table 2 
(Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler and Judith Gill) are members of the current elite of ICA, and 
share similar social features as the rest of the group (in terms of education, geographic 
background and professional affiliations). This data tends to show that although male 
domination over the arbitration elite is still overwhelming,71 some female arbitrators have 
developed successful power strategies to integrate the group.   
More specifically, members of the current elite – irrespective of whether they are men or 
women – appear to have leveraged their social capital to obtain positions at the intersection of 
various systems and gain traction in the transnational space discovered by the “secant 
marginals.” More specifically, these individuals have built transnational legitimacy along the 
paths cleared – almost incidentally – by their elders by combining various professional 
strands: an affiliation with a bar, a significant display of academic activities, and strong 
connections to arbitral institutions. Unlike the “secant marginals,” however, the new leading 
figures have consciously designed their cosmopolitan journey to build transnational 
legitimacy. Once they achieved this goal, some of these individuals even translated their 
                                                
69 Judith Gill, Toby Landau, Audley Sheppard, L. Yves Fortier, VV Veeder, David W. Rivkin, Constantine 
Partasides, Jan Paulsson. 
70 One of these female arbitrators (Maria Plum) gathered 4 appointments in 1960 and 1961 (she died in 1962). 
Plum was a German lawyer (and a former member of the NSDAP) who did not share any feature of the “secant 
marginals.” The other female arbitrator (Carmela Correale, USA) only obtained one appointment.  
71 It should be noted in this regard that various actors of international arbitration have made a “pledge” to 
improve the representation of women in 2016, see <http://www.arbitrationpledge.com/pledge> (last checked 
April 13, 2017). 
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transnational legitimacy back into their national systems of origins in a feedback loop of 
legitimacy that will be further discussed below. 
- Affiliation with a bar 
All of these individuals, without exception, are barristers or attorneys. While this does not 
mean that all currently practice as counsel, they have all kept their affiliation either to a bar 
(even without practicing), a law firm or a barrister chamber. Nine of them generate sufficient 
income as arbitrators (more rarely as counsel in arbitral proceedings) to run their own firms, 
usually of a relatively small size.72 Five of them are barristers in chambers located in 
London.73 Six of them are Queen’s Counsel in England and Wales, an honorary title for the 
most eminent law practitioners.74  
Most of these individuals appear to use their law firm or barrister chamber more as a platform 
for various activities (predominantly their activities as arbitrators) than as a place to practice 
the profession of attorney.75 This element is a distinguishing feature compared with the 
individuals in the first dataset, most of whom had a clear professional affiliation (to which 
they added their activities as arbitrators). By contrast, the individuals listed in Table 2 are 
professional arbitrators who have assembled features of various professional activities while 
sharing their affiliation with a bar as a distinctive feature. The affiliation of these individuals 
to a bar, which could be interpreted as a sign of legal vernacularism, should not obfuscate 
their multinational backgrounds. In fact, nine of the individuals in Table 2 are licensed to 
                                                
72 Bernard Hanotiau (Hanotiau & van den Berg), Albert Jan van den Berg (Hanotiau & van den Berg), Yves 
Fortier (Cabinet Yves Fortier), Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler (Lévy Kaufmann-Kohler), Constantine Partasides 
(Three Crowns LLP), Yves Derains (Derains & Gharavi International), Laurent Lévy (Lévy Kaufmann-Kohler), 
Jan Paulsson (Three Crowns LLP), Michael Pryles (Dispute Resolution Services PTY Ltd).  
73 Toby Landau (Essex Court Chambers), VV Veeder (Essex Court Chambers), Julian Lew (20 Essex Street), 
Michael Pryles (20 Essex Street), William Rowley (20 Essex Street).  
74 Judith Gill, Toby Landau, Audley Sheppard, VV Veeder, Stephen Jagusch, Constantine Partasides. 
75 Michael Kerr, the first president of the LCIA, appears to have been a precursor in this regard. See Michael 
Kerr (2002) As Far as I Remember (Oxford/Portland: Hart Publishing), 328: “Then I finally left the courts and 
returned to Chambers. […] The then head, Tony Diamond, one of the original tenants, and the senior Clerk, 
David Grief, both asked me to come back as a full-time arbitrator. At that time this was something 
unprecedented for a retired Lord Justice. […] Chambers gave me a small room and full secretarial back-up, with 
typing, fax and everything. In return I paid them the same percentage of my receipts as all other members of 
Chambers, together with the same Clerk’s fees. We were all very happy with the arrangement.”  
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practice law in several jurisdictions.76 Eleven of them are partners in global law firms that 
employ hundreds (sometime thousands) of attorneys in all major cities throughout the world.77  
The uniformity across this pool of individuals confirms the finding in the first dataset 
according to which attorneys have progressively dominated the game of ICA. Through their 
affiliation with one or several bars, leading individuals signal their lawyering skills to the 
arbitration market. As previously noted, the need to display technical skills results from the 
judicialization process that has unfolded over several decades in ICA rather than the 
competition between attorneys and law professors (Stone Sweet & Grisel 2017). In fact, the 
competition between attorneys and law professors seems exaggerated when considering that 
almost all the individuals listed in Table 2 have also acquired the credentials of chaired 
professors (in addition to their bar affiliations). 
- Academic activities 
Almost all the individuals (23 out of 25) listed therein have built a portfolio of academic 
activities (table 2). Nine of them hold doctoral degrees in law.78 Most of these individuals 
pride themselves on teaching in various law schools and universities around the world. Four 
individuals began their careers as law professors and kept affiliations with law schools 
throughout their careers.79 Ten individuals, although not originally trained as law professors, 
obtained honorary, visiting or adjunct professorships at a later stage of their careers.80 Seven 
individuals have written reference textbooks or monographs on ICA.81 All of these 22 
                                                
76 Bernard Hanotiau, Toby Landau, Audley Sheppard, Albert Jan van den Berg, Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, 
Stephen Jagusch, Julian Lew, Jan Paulsson, Eduardo Silva Romero. 
77 Judith Gill (Allen & Overy), Gary Born (WilmerHale), Audley Sheppard (Clifford Chance), Emmanuel 
Gaillard (Shearman & Sterling), David W. Rivkin (Debevoise & Plimpton), Pierre Bienvenu (Norton Rose 
Fulbright), Stephen Jagusch (Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan), Henri Alvarez (Fasken Martineau), Klaus 
Sachs (CMS Hasche Sigle), Donald Donovan (Debevoise & Plimpton), Eduardo Silva Romero (Dechert).  
78 Bernard Hanotiau, Albert Jan van den Berg, Emmanuel Gaillard, Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Klaus Sachs, 
Laurent Lévy, Michael Pryles, Eduardo Silva Romero. 
79 Bernard Hanotiau, Albert Jan van den Berg, Emmanuel Gaillard, and Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler.  
80 Gary Born, Toby Landau, VV Veeder, Klaus Sachs, Laurent Lévy, Julian Lew, Donald Donovan, Jan 
Paulsson, Michael Pryles, and Eduardo Silva Romero.  
81 Gary Born, Albert Jan van den Berg, Emmanuel Gaillard, Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Constantine Partasides, 
Julian Lew, Jan Paulsson.  
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individuals regularly publish in academic journals on the subject of ICA. In that sense, the 
new generation of leading arbitrators appears to have followed the steps of figures such as 
Ernest Barda, Lazare Kopelmanas or Ernst Mezger (Table 1), who combined practical and 
academic interests throughout their careers. 
The involvement and association with academic institutions appears to be of primal 
importance for arbitrators. It signals their legal sophistication and ability to engage with 
lawyers originating from various countries. The web page of one of these arbitrators is telling 
in this regard: 
Mr. Born is an Honorary Professor of Law at the University of St. Gallen, Switzerland 
and Tsinghua University. He has also taught at Harvard Law School, University of 
Pennsylvania Law School, Stanford Law School, Georgetown University Law Center, 
National University of Singapore, Peking University School of Transnational Law, 
University of Virginia College of Law, University College London and the University 
of Arizona College of Law. 
 
Mr. Born is a member of the American Law Institute and of the Board of Trustees of 
the British Institute for International and Comparative Law. He has served on the 
Executive Council of the American Society of International Law, the Advisory 
Committee of the ALI’s Restatement of US International Arbitration Law, the 
Advisory Committee of the ALI Restatement of US Foreign Relation Law (Fourth) 
and as co-chair of the ABA International Section, Committee on International Aspects 
of Litigation. He is also a Vice President of the American Society of International Law 
[…].82 
 
This long list of academic affiliations shows the wide recognition of this arbitrator in various 
academic settings (universities, scientific societies, and academic journals) around the world 
(America, Europe, Asia, and Africa). An academic affiliation matters, burnishing the image of 
a legal specialist who can navigate with equal ease across various legal systems. By 
cultivating affiliations with academic institutions around the world, leading arbitrators signal 
their acculturation with multiple legal systems, their ability to apply various sets of domestic 
laws, and their familiarity with different lawyering styles. In addition, these individuals have 
not only anchored their legitimacy at the local level through academic affiliations, but they 
                                                
82 See Profile of Mr. Gary Born, <https://www.wilmerhale.com/gary_born/> (last accessed on 20 August 2016).  
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have also built legitimacy at a level that is specifically transnational by nurturing numerous 
connections with arbitral institutions. 
- Connections with arbitral institutions 
Connections with arbitral institutions are not simply anecdotal. They are quasi-systematic, at 
the highest levels of responsibility in the leading arbitral institutions around the world (table 
2). One counts 1 President of the ICC International Court of Arbitration, 2 Presidents of the 
Singapore International Arbitration Court, 3 Presidents of the London Court of International 
Arbitration, and 1 Secretary General of the ICC International Court of Arbitration. 
Table 3 summarizes the number of positions in leading arbitral institutions that have been 
held – in the present and in the past – by the individuals listed in Table 2.83  Most of these 
people have accumulated (in the present or in the past) several positions in leading arbitral 
institutions. Almost 90% (22 out of 25) of those listed in Table 2 held 2 or more positions in 
leading arbitral institutions. One of these individuals has even held 7 positions in these 
institutions.84 Again, the importance of the connections built with arbitral institutions was 
anticipated by the pioneers at the ICC, as shown by the examples of Paul van Reepinghen, 
who created the CEPANI in Belgium in 1969, and Ottoarndt Glossner, who chaired the ICC’s 
Commission on International Commercial Arbitration before founding the German Institute of 
Arbitration in 1974. The many connections of leading individuals with arbitral institutions 
reflect the institutionalization of the transnational field: leading arbitrators and institutions 
owe reciprocal allegiances to one another and build legitimacy by nurturing these connections 
at a level that is specifically transnational. 
 
                                                
83 These positions include inter alia president, vice president, member of the court, member of the board, and 
member of a commission.  
84 Michael Pryles has been member of the SIAC Court, President of the SIAC Court, Chairman of SIAC, 
member of the HKIAC International Advisory Board, member of the LCIA Court, member of the DIAC Board 
of Trustees, and member of the ICC Court (see <http://michaelpryles.com/appointments/>, last accessed 20 
August 2016).  
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----------------------- 
Table 3 about here 
------------------------ 
- Feedback loop of legitimacy 
The data simply do not support the story told by Dezalay and Garth: ICA was built by secant 
marginals and not by local elites. Once the former acquired legitimacy at the transnational 
level, many managed to translate it into status at the local level. As an ultimate step of the 
globalization process, the distinction between local and transnational elites seems to be 
increasingly blurry, as leading individuals can diffuse social capital from the local to the 
global and vice versa. 
There are several prominent examples of this feedback loop. Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, a 
Swiss national, was appointed to the Board of Directors of UBS, the largest Swiss bank, in 
2005. While other individuals in Table 2 have been board members of companies in their 
home countries (notably, L. Yves Fortier in Canada), the global standing of Gabrielle 
Kaufmann-Kohler seems to have been a key element in her appointment as a board member 
of UBS.  In announcing the news, UBS stated: 
Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler is a practicing attorney and partner with Schellenberg 
Wittmer as well as a Professor of private international law at University of Geneva 
Law School. She is admitted to the New York State Bar and the Geneva Bar and holds 
a doctorate of the University of Basle. Previously she has been a partner of Baker & 
McKenzie and a legal adviser at UBS in New York. She acts as an international 
arbitrator in commercial and investment disputes and sports cases and was ranked 
among the top ten arbitrators worldwide in a 2005 survey by ‘The American 
Lawyer’.85 
 
Consider the study of the six individuals in Table 2 who are Queen’s Counsel in England and 
Wales. The title of Queen’s Counsel is honorary, and it rewards the most eminent members of 
the legal profession in England and Wales. It is a marker of “excellence in advocacy in the 
                                                
85 See “UBS announces board nominations and executive appointments” (December 14, 2005) 
(<https://www.ubs.com/global/de/about_ubs/investor_relations/releases/adhocre/new_display_page_adhocre.htm
l/en/2005/12/14/ubs_announces_board_nominations_and_executive.html> last checked on December 15, 2016). 
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higher [English and Welsh] courts,”86 and of the British legal elite (Kauppi & Madsen 
2013:145). The title is, par excellence, the sign of belonging to a closed group of local elites 
who display specific features that can only be fully appreciated by local insiders. One of these 
specific features is the exercise of the profession of barrister, which is considered to be the 
aristocracy of the British legal profession (in contradistinction to the profession of solicitor). 
In fact, only barristers were allowed to apply for the award of Queen’s Counsel prior to 1995. 
Since 1996, when solicitors were invited to apply for the award of Queen’s Counsel, 98.2% of 
successful applicants were barristers.87 The data (Table 2)  is striking when considered in this 
light. Of the six individuals who obtained the title of Queen’s Counsel in Table 2, only two 
are barristers,88 and four are solicitors.89 Although the pool is too limited to draw general 
conclusions, it would appear that these four individuals were able, against the odds, to 
translate their formidable global legitimacy into the finest mark of local elitism: the title of 
“Queen’s Counsel.”  
To further explore this possibility, I have compiled data on the solicitors who have 
successfully applied for the title of Queen’s Counsel since 2008 (table 4). Of the 26 solicitors 
who were appointed as “Queen’s Counsel” during this time period, 23 were specialists in 
ICA. Arbitrators have translated their transnational success into a vernacular form of social 
capital, and the fact that solicitor’s firms (as opposed to barrister chambers) dominate ICA has 
not hurt them. In Dezalay and Garth’s account, local elites built and shaped a new version of 
ICA. The data, however, show that it was transnational elites of a particular sort – the secant 
marginals – who were more influential. 
 
                                                
86 See the official website “QC Appointments” (<http://www.qcappointments.org> last checked on December 
15, 2016). 
87 See “Queen’s Counsel Statistics from 1995 to present” (<http://www.qcappointments.org/completed-
competitions/> last checked on December 15, 2016). The remaining 98.2% are all barristers. 
88 Toby Landau and VV Veeder. 
89 Judith Gill, Stephen Jagusch, Audley Sheppard, Constantine Partasides. 
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-------------------- 
Table 4 
------------------- 
 
Conclusion 
In this article, I have focused on the impact of a relatively stable group of individuals 
on the development of ICA as an autonomous legal order at the global level. The article casts 
serious doubt on some of the core claims of Dezalay and Garth, who proposed an alternative 
reading of the evolution of ICA and, more generally, of the dynamics of legal globalization. 
Most importantly, they claimed that ICA underwent a transformation in the 1980s/1990s, as a 
result of a struggle between two groups, the members of which represented a different legal 
tradition that demanded different skills and sources of legitimacy. In contrast, the data show 
that the reconstruction of ICA dates to an earlier time period, when the field became 
dominated by “secant marginals.” This group did not seek to enhance or exploit competition 
between national approaches; rather, they actively worked to build bridges across legal 
systems and professions. They did so through “institutional bricolage,” combining basic 
features of various national systems into a new transnational order. Dezalay and Garth were 
right to notice that the transformation of ICA accelerated in the 1980s and 1990s, as larger 
numbers of high-stakes cases flowed into the system.  But the group on which they focus 
actually built onto foundations laid much earlier by the “secant marginals.” 
My analysis shows that the “field settlement” that did occur resulted in hybridization, not the 
pyrrhic victory of one group over the other(s). None of the individuals working in the 
foundational period – roughly 1950-1970 – was a professional arbitrator; instead, they 
belonged to a great diversity of professions, with the predominance of attorneys (Graph 1). 
They operated at the intersection of different legal systems and professions, as skilled “secant 
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marginals” and pioneers of transnational law. As with Nietzsche’s tightrope walker, “secant 
marginals” maintained a fragile balance on the narrow path to transnationalism, stretched 
between several “towers” of legitimacy. 
By the end of the 1960s, stable features of a new, transnational legal profession had emerged 
at the intersection of various strands of emerging practices and sources of legitimacy, a 
dynamic reinforced by the practice of re-appointments (Graph 3). The current ICA elite 
(Table 2) reproduced and crystallized the features of the “secant marginals” into a stable 
professional identity. Members of this elite share common characteristics: they maintain close 
ties with the business world, through their affiliations to the bar and their connections with 
arbitral institutions (Table 3); and they accrete intellectual authority within the academic 
world. Professors become attorneys, attorneys become professors, with each group 
complementing (and reinforcing) what is, in effect, a hybrid legitimacy. Unlike the “secant 
marginals,” however, this group appears to have been more self-consciously devoted to 
leveraging social capital (notably education) to accrete global legitimacy. This is a major 
difference from the “secant marginals,” who happened to combine various sociological 
features resulting from personal trajectories and tastes, rather than choice. Some of the young 
technocrats are even able to capitalize on their transnational status, in order to build social 
capital in local arenas (Table 4). 
At a more general level, this article presents a narrative of globalization wherein individuals 
acting at the junction of various social systems are able to create and then maintain a new 
transnational space. In ICA, this space has acquired density over time, with newcomers 
reproducing the perceived features of the pioneers of global law to become its new leaders. 
This article, of course, does not exhaust the socio-legal analysis of legal globalization, a 
complex process in which various actors interact in myriad ways. But it does tell a story in 
which transnational law initially draws strength from its own perceived weaknesses, namely 
 36 
unrootedness and marginality.
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Table 1 – The Grand Old Men, Twenty Years Before (1922-1973) 
 
 
 
 
Graph 1 – The Grand Old Men: Cumulative Number of Appointments per Profession  
(1922-1973) 
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Attorneys
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Member of trade federation
Professors
International civil servant
Name Gender Nationality Year of birth Profession 
Number of 
appointments 
Ernest Barda M Italian 1903 Attorney 13 
Ottoarndt 
Glossner M German 1923 Attorney 11 
Berthold 
Goldman M French 1913 Professor 13 
Lazare 
Kopelmanas M French 1907 
International civil 
servant 13 
Gunnar 
Lagergren M Swedish 1912 Judge 13 
Ernst Mezger M German 1909 Attorney 10 
Henri 
Monneray M French 1914 Attorney 12 
André 
Panchaud M Swiss 1901 Judge 13 
Pierre-Jean 
Pointet M Swiss 1910 Professor 16 
Paul van 
Reepinghen M Belgian 1912 Trade federation 
 
28 
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Graph 2: The sociological evolution of ICC arbitrators 
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Graph 3: The emergence of the ICC arbitration club 
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Table 2: The Young Technocrats, Twenty Years Later (2015) 
 
Name Gender Nationality 
 
Birth 
 
Academic 
activities 
Position in 
an arbitral 
institution 
Attorney 
or 
barrister 
Judith Gill F UK 1959 Y Y Y 
Bernard Hanotiau M Belgium 1947 Y Y Y 
Gary Born M USA 1955 Y Y Y 
Toby Landau M UK 1967 Y Y Y 
Audley Sheppard M New Zealand 1960 Y Y Y 
AJ van den Berg M Netherlands 1949 Y Y Y 
Emmanuel 
Gaillard M France 1952 Y Y Y 
L. Yves Fortier M Canada 1935 N Y Y 
VV Veeder M UK 1948 Y Y Y 
David W. Rivkin M USA 1955 N Y Y 
Pierre Bienvenu M Canada 1957 N Y Y 
Gabrielle 
Kaufmann-Kohler F Switzerland 1952 Y Y Y 
Alexis Mourre M France 1963 Y Y Y 
Stephen Jagusch M New Zealand 1967 Y Y Y 
Constantine 
Partasides M UK 1969 Y N Y 
Henri Alvarez M Canada 1954 Y Y Y 
Klaus Sachs M Germany 1951 Y Y Y 
Yves Derains M France 1945 Y Y Y 
Laurent Lévy M Switzerland/Brazil 1948 Y Y Y 
Julian Lew M UK 1948 Y Y Y 
Donald Donovan M USA 1955 Y Y Y 
Jan Paulsson M France 1949 Y Y Y 
Michael Pryles M Australia 1945 Y Y Y 
Eduardo Silva 
Romero M Colombia/France 1971 Y Y Y 
William Rowley M Canada 1943 Y Y Y 
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Table 3: Super-arbitrators and arbitral institutions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: The appointment of solicitors as Queen’s Counsel in England & Wales  
(2008-2017)  
 
 
Year 08/09 09/10 10/11 11/12 12/13 13/14 14/15 15/16 16/17	 TOTAL 
Applicants 4 10 5 2 2 7 9 13 13 65 
Appointments 3 1 2 0 1 5 5 3 6 26 
Arbitration 
specialists 
among 
appointees 
3 0 1 0 1 5 5 3 5 23 
 
